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The Scope of Serious Crime and Preventive Justice 
Tom Sorell 
 
Abstract: 
I offer an account of serious crime that goes beyond victimizing crimes committed by 
individuals against other individuals. This approach extends the well-known framework 
offered by Von Hirsch and Jareborg to include crimes undermining welfare-producing 
institutions. I then consider how the seriousness of crime justifies preventive measures, 
including the criminalization of acts preparatory to the commission of serious crime. I shall 
defend preventive measures, including highly intrusive ones, for the most serious crimes, 
such as terrorism in the form of mass killing, but I shall take issue with very expansive 
conceptions of serious crime that include what are intuitively much less serious offences than 
terrorism or murder. In England and Wales, the Serious Crime Act (2007) lists relevant types 
of serious crime in its Schedule 1.  This and other pieces of serious crime legislation in the 
UK are discussed critically. 
Keywords: Serious Crime, Public Crimes, Preventive Justice, Culpability, Harm 
 
 
What is a serious crime? The question is important for at least three reasons. First, sentencing 
policy, at least in England and Wales, is geared to the seriousness of a crime, understood as 
determined by scales of harm and culpability; second, whether a jurisdiction overcriminalizes 
wrongdoing is directly related to whether some kinds of wrongdoing are not serious enough 
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to be punished. Uncontroversial criminalization tends to be associated with offences 
conventionally regarded as serious: murder, wounding, and rape, for example. Offences that 
seem remote from these in relation to harm caused, but that are still subject to prison 
sentences, may appear to have much weaker claims to legitimate criminalization. The 
possession and use of certain drugs is a much-discussed case in point. Third, there is a 
connection between serious crime and the justifiability of preventive measures:  the more 
serious the crime, it is plausible to claim, the more justifiable it is for those authorized to 
enforce the law to prevent it. For the most serious crimes –-terrorism in the form of an 
organized, large-scale, lethal attack, for example— policing policy can even seem to permit 
the use of preventive measures that are secret, highly intrusive, or border on entrapment. Here 
the issue is whether that permission is morally justified by the seriousness of the crime. 
In this paper I concentrate on serious crime mainly in connection with the third of the three 
reasons just given for defining serious crime: namely, the way the seriousness of crime 
justifies preventive measures. I shall defend preventive measures, including highly intrusive 
ones, for the most serious crimes, but I shall consider critically very expansive conceptions of 
serious crime that include what are intuitively much less serious offences than terrorism or 
murder. In England and Wales, the Serious Crime Act (2007) lists relevant types of serious 
crime in its Schedule 1.  These include infringements of copyright, fraud, tax evasion, and 
counterfeiting, alongside people trafficking, arms trafficking and child prostitution. The 
Serious Crime Act (2007) permits certain kinds of preventive measures against a very large 
array of Schedule 1 offences. Although these measures are neither routinely secret nor very 
intrusive, they are liberty-limiting, and might be thought to infringe the norm of presuming 
innocence. What is more, the offences in question are not easily conceptualized as involving 
the same kind of harm as one-on-one victimizing and violent offences, which are probably 
the paradigm cases of serious crime. Does this show that the serious crimes in question 
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shouldn’t be prevented?  Not necessarily: it may show instead that the conceptualization of 
serious crime needs to be pluralistic or hybrid, and that different crimes can be serious for 
different reasons.  Differently conceptualized, the serious crimes in question may indeed be 
serious enough to justify prevention, but the character of the criminal activity in this range 
may make the preventive measures contemplated in existing legislation ineffective or unjust. 
The rest of this paper falls into five sections. In the first, I quickly expound the standard 
conceptualization of serious crime as victimizing crime. Section II extends that 
conceptualization to include acts of undermining harm-minimizing or welfare-increasing 
institutions. Section III asks whether that hybrid conceptualization encompasses the whole 
range of serious crime e.g. as represented in Schedule 1 of the Serious Crime Act (2007). It 
turns out that the conceptualization requires refinement. In section IV, I consider the 
justifiability of dirty-handed preventive policing measures for the most serious crimes, and 
liberty-limiting preventive orders for lesser serious crimes. Although liberty-limiting orders 
are not always justified, I deny (in section V) that there is something wrong with preventive 
orders in general, deriving from a supposedly objectionable “logic” of preventive justice. 
 
I. 
The most systematic treatment of the relative seriousness of well-recognized criminal 
offences is due to Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg.1 They distinguish offences by the 
culpability of the offender and the effects of a standard example of a type of offence in a 
scale of “harm gradations,” these in turn being related to various levels of a human “standard 
of living”2 corresponding to various dimensions of human interest.3 According to them, the 
most basic dimension of human interest is in physical integrity. The standard of living that 
caters only to physical integrity and no further interests they call “subsistence.”  The most 
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serious harms threaten physical integrity by taking away subsistence. Offences that take away 
subsistence are correspondingly the most serious offences.  The central illustration is 
homicide.  
Battery is less serious than homicide. It is an offence connected with the same dimension of 
interests (physical integrity) and the same level of standard of living (subsistence) as 
homicide, but its effects are temporary, and they fall short of taking away subsistence.  
However, assault and battery also engage further dimensions of interest.  Von Hirsch and 
Jareborg distinguish, in addition to interests in subsistence, interests in material amenity, 
interests in freedom from humiliation, and interests in autonomy and privacy. According to 
von Hirsch and Jareborg, assault and battery standardly involve humiliation, which adds to 
their gravity as offences, even when their physical effects in the dimension of integrity are 
relatively short-lived and not very painful.   
Von Hirsch and Jareborg apply their analysis not only to crimes that produce physical injury 
in victims or that affect them through the threat of physical injury (varieties of rape, armed 
robbery) but also crimes  that violate privacy and deprive people materially (burglary) or only 
take away amenity (car theft). These are all victimizing types of offences, but they differ in 
seriousness, because not all set back an equally wide set of interests, and because (as in the 
case of loss of amenity) the loss resulting from the crime can be met by replacement.   
The von Hirsch-Jareborg approach readily accommodates differences between attempts and 
actual commission of serious offences, and it is capable of accommodating the relative 
severity of combinations of offences. So, within its chosen area of application, it has some 
claim to be both systematic and plausible. It can also be adapted to further offences.  For 
example, terrorism –in the sense of a lethal act carried out to force a government to change 
policy and to spread fear among a local population-- is not explicitly considered by von 
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Hirsch and Jareborg, but it is related to crimes that their analysis readily encompasses, such 
as wounding and homicide. Terrorism –in the sense of a large-scale lethal attack4-- matters to 
this paper because (i) pretheoretically, it has some claim to be counted among the most 
serious crimes; (ii) the most serious crimes might be those that most easily justify preventive 
measures, (iii) the most serious crimes might justify, if any do, the most dirty-handed of 
preventive measures, that is, preventive measures that consist of or involve means that are 
normally immoral or legally questionable, such as long-term deception, measures bordering 
on entrapment or inciting crime, and collusion in crime or tolerating crime for the sake of 
gathering evidence for a prosecution. 
Does the von Hirsch-Jareborgh theory tend to support the intuition that terrorism in the form 
of the large-scale lethal attack might be at the severe end even of serious crime? Yes, the 
theory implies that terrorism in this form is standardly more serious than typical homicide, 
because it is detrimental to a wider array of interests and is intended to take away many lives. 
Besides the interest in subsistence through bodily integrity that each of its possibly thousands 
of victims might have, terrorism runs counter to the interests its victims have in being free 
from fear.  Furthermore, terrorism sets back interests in autonomy, including political 
autonomy. This is because it often seeks to bypass democratic institutions to coerce actions 
by governments, actions that would typically not have the support of many or most members 
of a citizenry, and that might even command their overwhelming opposition.  
 
II. 
When von Hirsch and Jareborg consider the limitations of their analysis, and how it might be 
extended to types of widely-recognized crime that it does not readily cover but that are 
nevertheless regarded as serious in many jurisdictions, they seem to me to go wrong:  
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Our analysis has been directed at the simple victimizing offence: defendant 
(intentionally or negligently) injures (or creates an unjustified risk of injuring) another 
person, in a manner proscribed by the criminal law. Our thesis has been that the extent 
of the injury can ordinarily be gauged by the impact on the standard victim's living 
standard. This simple paradigm, however, does not embrace the entire criminal law. 
Various types of crime involve numerous victims, numerous actors, harm to 
consenting victims, or do not directly seem to involve injury to persons at all. . . . 
Other types of crimes present a more fundamental question: does the obnoxiousness 
of the conduct reside in its injurious impact on persons, or some other feature? 
Consider crimes involving duties of citizenship, such as tax fraud. . . . Some crimes, 
finally, seem aimed at protecting interests other than chiefly those of human victims.  
We could continue this list, but its implications should be evident already. There is no 
unitary account that can explain the harm dimension in all kinds of crime 5 
 
The idea that the single-agent/single non-consenting victim case is the central one in criminal 
law, and that it is increases in numbers –of victims or agents—that force departures from the 
main account, is clearly falsified not only by tax fraud, but by a whole range of criminal 
offences including perjury, bribery, money -laundering, counterfeiting and many others.  As I 
shall suggest, the rationale for regarding these offences as serious is not to do with 
victimization, but with the way their general or organized commission undermines harm-
reducing or welfare-increasing public institutions. 
Are von Hirsch and Jareborg right to say, in view of the recalcitrant cases they mention, that 
there is no unitary account of the harm dimension in all kinds of serious crime? There might 
be a more unitary account, even if no fully unitary account is available. A possible source for 
a more unitary theory is Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, the primary purpose of the 
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state, and the guiding purpose of law-making is “public safety,” where the term is understood 
to extend beyond security from physical attack.6  A body of law gives every citizen a strong 
reason for abstaining from general violence, and for working for a modest prosperity from 
which the security-promoting institutions of the state as well as general production can be 
financed.  The overarching goal of the state is to stave off war and to create conditions for a 
“commodious” life for each. The state’s military, economic, educational, and legal 
institutions are instrumental to public safety in this broad sense.  Those who would break the 
law, in particular by not taking part as the law prescribes in military, economic, and 
educational institutions of the state, increase the chances of violence and poverty.  
Tax fraud, bribery, perjury, counterfeiting –all of these weaken what can be understood with 
Hobbes’s help to be the harm-reducing or safety-promoting institutions of the state. The same 
can be said of laundering the proceeds of crime, as that allows law-breakers to keep the 
rewards of crime, encourages others who know about their success to follow their example, 
and allows more crime to be financed from a position in the mainstream economy.  As for 
crimes like homicide and assault, these can be interpreted as strong signs of a will to behave 
as if the fact that something was made unlawful by an authorized sovereign was not a good 
reason for omitting certain kinds of action, or, in Hobbes’s terms, as if there were no state and 
warlike behavior or general violence were permissible.7 Even organized crime falls into place 
in a Hobbesian understanding of crime: it is one of the “regular but unlawful systems,”8 that 
is, unitary co-operative organizations within the state that work against the sovereign and his 
authorized institutions, and that therefore betray the promise of submission that each member 
of such an organization makes. 
A Hobbesian account unifies victimizing action and institution-undermining action.  It 
conceptualizes direct victimization at the level of individuals as an attempt to provoke or 
return to the war of all against all. It conceptualizes familiar state institutions and wider 
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public institutions –courts, tax collectors, armies, properly regulated schools and universities, 
regulated markets of all kinds, even properly run churches -- as bulwarks against a local war 
of all against all and as facilitators of commodious life –life containing a modest distribution 
of goods above the level of survival. In this respect  --in its reliance on the idea of 
commodious life--Hobbes’s concept of public safety is tied to a sort of “standard of living” in 
roughly the sense of von Hirsch and Jareborg.   
Of course, many other elements of Hobbes’s account –its dependence on a hypothetical 
contract among a majority of subjects, its insistence on the absolute submission of all citizens 
to a sovereign, the idea that a sovereign power is above the law, the idea that law itself is 
what the sovereign declares it to be, so long as he sincerely thinks it promotes safety, all of 
these lie well outside the liberal presuppositions of von Hirsch and Jareborg. These illiberal 
Hobbesian elements can be rejected. But even liberals can agree with Hobbes that some 
serious crimes directly do harm while others act against harm-reducing or basic welfare-
increasing (in Hobbesian language, “public safety”-promoting) institutions.  This insight is a 
way of seeing the connection between kinds of serious crime that von Hirsch and Jareborg 
can accommodate and others that elude their account. 
A reason von Hirsch and Jareborg have a one-sided account of serious crime is that they 
approach the topic from the angle of sentencing and not, as Hobbes does, from the standpoint 
of a law-making agent. A sentencing perspective like theirs assumes a schedule of standard 
crimes and humane punishments. It tries to arrive at conditions that the offences must meet 
for the usual associated punishments to seem reasonable, and for differences in punishments 
for different crimes –usually measured in lengths of incarceration in humane prison 
conditions-- to seem reasonable. The crucial considerations are, roughly, the amount of harm 
done and the degree to which the offender aimed at and was responsible for that harm.  
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Harm looks different from a legislator’s perspective. It is not just the result of crime, but of 
disease, failed harvests, floods, and of the lack of institutional support in normal times for 
those with least.   The reduction of harm is associated with a wider range of public 
institutions than von Hirsch and Jareborg consider – not just the courts, police, and prisons, 
but public health laboratories, say, or water treatment plants, or dams or pesticide purchasers.  
Then there are legislative purposes other than harm reduction: for example, to facilitate 
efficient economic exchange; to educate people; to provide or encourage the production of 
effective shelter, to provide or encourage the production and distribution of food. What ties 
together institutions of all the kinds we have been reviewing is that they are supposed to raise 
the standard of living –in the von Hirsch and Jareborg sense—of those who take part in them.  
Serious crime is crime that depresses the standard of living either directly –through 
victimization--or through weakening institutions calculated to secure for most people a basic 
standard of living. 
Depending on how essential institutions are to a basic living standard, the standard that is, or 
is close to, survival, acting against the (rules of) the relevant institutions can be prima facie 
criminalizable on grounds of serious harm. And the more regular and the more egregious the 
undermining of the institutions, the more serious the relevant offences can be understood to 
be.  For example, if perjury and bribery are routine in a given jurisdiction, they can disable 
the local administration of justice and provide pretexts for rebellion or the erection of 
competing, informal and arbitrary institutions for dispute-resolution. Again, large-scale 
counterfeiting can undermine economic exchange of all kinds. A domestic black economy or 
the existence abroad of “tax havens” can so reduce local tax receipts that even basic policing 
and redistribution from the well-off to the destitute are ruled out. Organized crime can 
provide resources for the growth of informal power structures that compete with those of the 
state that can create no-go areas for state institutions, and so on. 
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 How can anti-institutional behavior be added to the von Hirsch-Jareborg account?  We can 
say that 
 a crime is serious if it intentionally inflicts on an identifiable victim a type of harm 
that is high in the von Hirsch and Jareborg scale of harm, or if its general  or 
organized commission would undermine institutions for protecting a basic standard of 
living, and the relevant legislative authority has evidence of  its general or organized 
commission.9 
To illustrate, if the worst-off in a jurisdiction are kept above the most precarious existence by 
a limited budget for payments or vouchers for goods, then others who are not among the 
worst-off, but who seek to benefit from that system, contribute to an easily foreseeable 
worsening of the plight of the worst-off, a worsening that registers on a harm scale, even 
though no one of the worst-off is targeted or “victimized.” 
In this example, we can distinguish between uncoordinated fraud, where people who are not 
among the worst-off each opportunistically and fraudulently appropriate a small share of 
benefits intended for the worst-off, and organized fraud, e.g. where criminals forge 
documents necessary for claiming payments or vouchers, and these are sold on a big scale to 
all comers.10  Organized fraud is much more likely to take place on a large scale and therefore 
to undermine an institution than one-time or uncoordinated fraud, making it more serious as a 
crime. Midway on the spectrum between uncoordinated and organized commission of crime 
is its uncoordinated but general commission, as when welfare benefit fraud is uncoordinated 
but widely practised. General commission is a reasonable ground for criminalization in the 
kind of case we have been considering even in the absence of organized criminals. 
With the addition of a plausible empirical assumption, the proposed hybrid criterion for 
seriousness of crime can even accommodate cases like drug dealing, which some have argued 
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is or can be a victimless crime. The additional empirical assumption, for which there is ample 
evidence, is that illicit markets in drugs are regulated by a lot of threatened and actual  
victimizing violence, some of it life-threatening, mainly inflicted by members of criminal 
gangs on one another and on customers and dealers who default on payments.11  This means 
that even if illegal drug purchases are typically uncoerced and do not lead to debilitating 
addiction, they take place within a market that relies heavily and conspicuously on 
victimizing violence. Knowledge of that violence is not esoteric: the violence is effective 
because it is generally visible to market participants.  Acting as a dealer in the drug market 
signals a tolerance of that violence. Acting as a regular purchaser can also signal tolerance.  
What is more, acting as a purchaser can help to fund drug dealers to buy de facto impunity 
from police investigation and prosecution through bribery.  Taking part in the drug market 
may also contribute indirectly to the recruitment of young people to crime instead of 
education, and to imbalances in the allocation of policing and other resources in response.12  
If drug markets and other illicit markets are themselves regarded as (informal) institutions, 
then we can complicate the criterion for serious crime as follows: 
A crime is serious if 
(i) it intentionally inflicts on an identifiable victim a type of harm that is 
high on the von Hirsch and Jareborg scale of harm; 
(ii) its general or organized commission would undermine institutions for 
protecting a basic standard of living, and the relevant legislative 
authority has evidence of  its general or organized commission;  
(iii) its generalized or organized commission actually maintains an  
institution depending  heavily, and   known by those who take part in it 
to depend heavily, on type (i) serious crime. 
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Type (iii) serious crime could arguably cover purchases of some class-A drugs; less 
controversially, it would cover importation of class-A drugs and running a distribution 
network.  It would also include purchases of services from people who are trafficked, as in 
illicit labor markets. People-trafficking itself is of course directly victimizing. A final 
example is taking part in a market for photographs of child abuse.  
Although I have been speaking in general terms about “institutions,” there are reasons for 
thinking that acting to undermine specifically legal ones –courts, the police-- is more serious 
criminality than acting to undermine others, because of relations of dependence between legal 
and other institutions.  For example, a welfare agency is in theory answerable to the courts, 
but not conversely. Again, criminals who succeed in undermining legal institutions acquire 
the freedom to victimize while accumulating and legitimizing the proceeds of crime. The 
resulting financial power  (especially when exercised behind the facade of legitimate 
business) enables criminals to influence legislation, to buy strategically valuable information 
from the authorities, to get the best professional services to expand their activities, and to 
defend against prosecution in a “home” jurisdiction, and to diversify and globalize their 
activities.  On this view, bribery of judges or the police might be at the most serious end of 
the institution-undermining range of serious crimes, because it facilitates the commission of 
all other crimes and especially organized crime. 
Serious crimes can be both victimizing and (indirectly) undermining of institutions. Drug 
dealing is one case in point. Terrorism –as previously defined in section I-- is another. 
Terrorism can aim at death on a large scale, so that, when successful, it inflicts the most 
severe kind of harm on its victims. It is also an attempt to coerce governments and to bypass 
peaceful participation in political institutions. When terrorist acts are carried out in liberal 
democracies, liberal democratic governments may limit liberties and be supported by citizens 
for doing so.  This can be understood as a kind of erosion of liberal institutions. Again, when 
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democratic governments co-operate with terrorists, say be paying ransoms or guaranteeing 
safe passage, the incentive to pursue demands through institutional channels may weaken.  
Under such conditions,terrorism counts as a serious crime twice over by our criterion. 
Is a crime that is both victimizing on a large scale and undermining of institutions more 
serious than one which is merely serious under the victimizing heading? Yes, but the 
contribution of institutional undermining may be slight in comparison to the victimizing 
component, because the most extreme victimizing harm takes away conditions for life itself, 
while the associated  undermining of institutions need not do so. Again, it takes time to 
undermine institutions, and acts that cumulatively have this effect and create a tipping point 
may individually be much less corrosive of a living standard than a victimizing act.  
 
III. 
Do all crimes recognized as serious under English law count as serious according to the 
criteria given?  Schedule I of the Serious Crime Act (2007)13 recognizes all of the following 
as serious crimes: drug trafficking, people trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution and child 
sex, armed robbery, money laundering, fraud, tax evasion, corruption and bribery, 
counterfeiting, blackmail, intellectual property, and environmental offences, including large-
scale fishing by prohibited methods and water pollution.  Many of these offences are directly 
victimizing. Counterfeiting, intellectual property offences and some environmental crimes are 
different.  They undermine welfare-producing institutions, namely legally permitted 
commercial markets, but with no particular connection to a basic standard of living. Do our 
criteria of serious crime accommodate these types of crime? 
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Since the kind of counterfeiting referred to in the Serious Crime Act (2007) is of money,14 
and since access to the cashless economy is usually confined to those who are employed or 
who have financial resources greater than those of people with a basic standard of living, the 
institution-undermining criterion already outlined seems to apply. The adulteration of the 
supply of currency will probably affect the worst-off disproportionately, robbing them of 
some of the means of subsistence. It will also adversely affect relatively badly-off sellers of 
goods in the cash economy. If it is the work of organized crime and conducted on a large 
scale, the sector of the economy depending on cash transactions may suffer ill effects. 
Many of the offences in the Serious Crime Act (2007) are assumed by the legislation to be 
carried out by organized crime.15 The organization of the commission of offences is a way of 
multiplying offences, and so a feature of criminal activity that aggravates the offences 
committed.  The more often the offence is committed, the greater the ill effect or harm 
associated with it. But there is also a sense in which the gravity of even a seldom-committed 
offence is aggravated by organization.  Organized crime not only concentrates the law-
breaking potential of a plurality of agents, keeping a multitude of people ready to commit 
many crimes, including the worst victimizing crimes, as directed; it also encourages the 
division of labor among criminals and specialization, and erects and maintains a structure of 
authority that competes with legitimate authority, as well as with legitimate business. 
Organized crime enforces its authority and its share of commercial markets typically by 
extreme violence.  These facts, and the fact that some organized crime gangs can engage in 
the whole spectrum of offences anticipated by Schedule I, suggests that any crime committed 
by organized crime is thereby more serious than the same crime committed by the 
autonomous criminal, and perhaps any crime characteristically committed by an organized 
criminal gang rises to the threshold for serious crime. 
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Against this background, the inclusion of seemingly minor offences in Schedule 1 makes 
some sense. Take intellectual property offences. These are widely committed by individuals 
in the UK, but with no obvious adverse effects for the worst-off. The people hurt by online 
piracy might be thought to be only rich music, film and software producers, who remain well 
off even if the offences are committed.16 So intellectual property offences seem to be left out 
by the institution-undermining criterion of serious crime. They seem not to pass the test for a 
type (ii) serious offence.  Or at least they seem to be left out unless the market or markets in 
music, film and software make such a difference to the standard of living of those 
participating in them that generalized acts of weakening it are very harmful. Without taking a 
stand on this question, it is possible to refine our criterion of seriousness in crime by letting 
the criminal organization of intellectual property offences have weight of its own.  For the 
same reasons that organized crime in general is objectionable, the participation of organized 
crime in the commission of an otherwise minor offence could turn it into a serious offence.17 
This line of thought suggests that we should add a sufficient condition to the trio of 
conditions so far introduced: 
A crime is serious if 
(i) it intentionally inflicts on an identifiable victim a type of harm 
that is high on the von Hirsch and Jareborg scale of harm; 
(ii)  if its general  or organized commission would undermine  
institutions for protecting a basic standard of living, and the 
relevant legislative authority has evidence of  its general  or 
organized commission;  
(iii) its generalized or organized commission actually maintains an  
institution depending  heavily, and known by those who take 
part in it to depend heavily, on type (i) serious crime or 
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(iv) it is committed on a large scale and is organized. 
Intellectual property offences seem properly to be classified as serious if they are type (iv) 
serious crimes.  Not all type (iv) serious crimes have to be the work of conventional crime 
gangs. A technology could facilitate it in such a way that it began to be practised on a large 
scale, so that the economic losses to the owners of the relevant intellectual property were very 
great. This may have been the form that widespread online piracy originally took, facilitated 
by content-sharing platforms on the internet. Again, there are problematic intermediate cases: 
Where a political movement, such as the Pirate Party in Europe, campaigns for freedom to 
download and urges civil disobedience as part of a campaign to decriminalize online privacy, 
things are not so clear. Let us consider people who respond to that call. Evidently, we do not 
have piracy plain and simple, but there is still significant financial loss to companies who 
produce and distribute musical works in good faith, and who invest money they prevented by 
piracy from earning back.18 Again, if piracy is part of a political campaign, one would expect 
the pirates not to try to evade the existing penalties for what they do, but to gain publicity 
from taking the punishment for the relevant offences. 
 
IV. 
The more serious the crime, the more justified its prevention, even by dubious means, if no 
alternative means are available. Or so I shall argue. Our previous discussion has suggested, 
following von Hirsch and Jareborg, that the most serious victimizing crimes are those that 
threaten the lives of people, the more lives threatened the more serious the crime. On the 
other hand, the most serious institution-undermining crimes include bribery and corruption 
(especially of officials like police and judges) and fraud that takes away resources from those 
who are worst off economically. If the worst institution-undermining crimes are carried out 
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by organized crime groups, they are worse still, because of the way organization multiplies 
the adverse effects of crime.  The prevention of all of these kinds of serious crimes seems 
justified, but not necessarily by any and all means. 
Let us call a measure for preventing a serious crime “dirty-handed” if normally it would be 
morally wrong to implement it,  but implementing it in the case at hand would serve a 
morally good purpose. Dirty-handed, then, does not mean “wrong”; it means doing 
something of a type that is normally wrong, but can be used for a purpose that on balance 
justifies doing that thing in the circumstances. Undercover policing measures are relevant. 
They invariably involve deception, and often intrusion, including by bugging and interception 
of telephone- and internet-communications. These measures are normally wrong, since 
deception and intrusion are normally wrong. Their special status is reflected in law, since, in 
England and other legally similar jurisdictions, special official permission needs to be 
obtained before undercover operations are launched, and different normally excluded 
measures must be individually authorized, often for a limited period only.  For example, 
dirty-handed measures are common in both anti-pedophile operations and counter-terrorism.  
Are dirty-handed measures justified in the prevention of serious victimizing crime? Actual 
police practice in England assumes as much, and a justification for it is not hard to articulate 
in the case of life-threatening crime and crime against the particularly vulnerable. One partial 
justification is that many victimizing crimes are often extremely harmful to victims, with 
pervasive psychological ill effects quite apart from physical injury. The timing of these 
crimes is often unpredictable, and intervention is often only possible when their commission 
seems to be imminent. Dirty-handed measures can promote timely interventions by affording 
some foresight of the offender’s actions.  
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In the case of online grooming of children for sex, it is possible for police in England to 
intervene by assuming the identities of the children for a short time, once an invitation to 
meet has been issued by the offender, or an invitation seems imminent, based on what the 
groomer is saying to the potential victim. The offender can then be arrested and charged with 
meeting a child after grooming, and, while he is in custody, evidence of related offences can 
be collected by a seizure of computers and so on from his home. In this way, arrest for a 
preparatory offence can do more than prevent an imminent sexual assault: it can also aid 
prosecution for past offences, including offences related to downloading images of child 
abuse, a leading example of a type (iii) serious crime. 
Could the kind of measures used to prevent or prosecute serious victimizing crime ever be 
justified in the prevention or prosecution of institution-related serious crime?  Yes, at the 
“most serious” end of the spectrum of institution-related crime. For example, intrusive 
surveillance could well be justified to prosecute police receiving payments from individual 
criminals and crime gangs, on the ground that bribery facilitates victimizing crimes and also 
undermines a harm-reducing institution, namely the police, or a branch of the police. On the 
other hand, it seems to me doubtful that high-volume DVD piracy is harmful enough to 
justify the same tactics, unless the DVD-piracy operation of a big criminal gang were a 
convenient entry point for an investigation that might bring down the whole organization.  
The relevant legislation in England and Wales, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(2000), incorporates tests of both necessity and proportionality for intrusive surveillance. The 
proportionality test probably fails to be met in all but the most unusual cases of DVD piracy, 
while the necessity test might standardly be met only by highly victimizing crimes carried out 
or planned by forensically aware offenders, that is, offenders who are aware of, and know 
how to evade, police techniques for identifying and prosecuting offences. Against 
19 
 
forensically aware offenders, all but the most intrusive methods might produce no useful 
evidence. 
Not all preventive measures relevant to serious crime are necessarily implemented by the 
police. In relation to bribery of judges or other officials, professional standards boards or 
ombudsmen might invite complaints or reports of suspicions, and carry out investigations. 
Arrangements of this kind in principle avoid being dirty-handed. But they might also work 
more slowly and have less access to wrongdoing than covert methods. These facts might 
make them unsuitable for discouraging or prosecuting very well hidden wrongdoing. At the 
“most serious” end of corruption and bribery, where a wealthy criminal gang was able both to 
reward its insiders generously and  help to launder or conceal its payments, covert action 
might be necessary in a clear sense, even though the criminal activity taking place might be 
related to no specific victims and no specific criminal plans. 
Not all measures for preventing serious crime are surveillance or administrative measures. 
The Serious Crime Act (2007) instead introduces liberty-limiting ones. It enables courts to 
restrict the activities of those who have been convicted of Schedule 1 offences after they have 
served their sentences. Section 5 (3) illustrates the range of restrictions: 
Examples of prohibitions, restrictions or requirements that may be imposed on individuals 
(including partners in a partnership) by serious crime prevention orders include prohibitions 
or restrictions on, or requirements in relation to—  
(a) an individual's financial, property or business dealings or holdings;  
(b) an individual's working arrangements;  
(c) the means by which an individual communicates or associates with others, or the persons 
with whom he communicates or associates;  
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(d) the premises to which an individual has access;  
(e) the use of any premises or item by an individual;  
(f) an individual's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom 
and other places or otherwise). 
These are very broad areas of potential interference, and they seem to impose a penal burden 
on an offender even when a conviction is spent. Instead of returning to society with a clean 
slate, those who are released from prison after having been convicted of a serious crime are 
liable to suffer a considerable loss of autonomy, with conditions of life significantly 
determined by judicial decision.   
Serious crime prevention orders can last for five years. This is a long time: the corresponding 
loss of autonomy may make sense where a conviction for serious crime belongs to a long 
criminal record, or where there is evidence that an offence or offences were committed by 
members of organized criminal gangs.  Convicts leaving prison might face hard-to-refuse 
demands of co-operation from criminal gangs and might actually be helped not to co-operate 
by serious crime prevention orders  At the same time, non-members of criminal gangs could 
be impeded in a program of reform by the very same sort of order, and if the threshold for 
serious crime can be met by someone guilty of no more than online piracy, the risk of 
injustice seems substantial. 
 
V. 
Serious Crime Preventive Orders belong to a range of measures that have captured the 
attention of critics of so-called preventive justice.19  Some of these critics20 suggest that the 
very concept of preventive justice might verge on incoherence, because it envisages 
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punishments for people before they have committed a crime, or assumes powers for 
“precognizing” offences that belong to science fiction or Hollywood fantasy.21 Other critics 
concede that justice has always been concerned with prevention as well as punishment, but 
express doubts about the justifiability of certain instruments of prevention, including, in 
English law, various preventive orders, as well as the criminalization of acts of preparing 
serious crime. My own criticism of Serious Crime Prevention Orders in the last section 
concedes something to this scepticism.  My criticism was that, on its face, the Serious Crime 
Act (2007) allows preventive orders to be served on people convicted of relatively minor 
offences who do not belong to criminal gangs.  In such cases the restriction of autonomy can 
be disproportionate. But this criticism at most calls for the fine-tuning of the legislation, since 
most of the offences to which it is applied are serious and might in practice involve 
organized crime. 
Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner point out that the forerunner and prototype of all civil 
preventive orders in English law is the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), recently 
superseded by the Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance introduced in the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014). Ashworth and Zedner review a long list of 
objections against ASBOs: (1) They had the drawback of carrying disproportionately severe 
criminal penalties for their breach. Occasionally they prohibited behavior (e.g. spraying 
graffiti on public transport vehicles) that caused no harm to anyone, and yet breaches carried 
penalties as high as, or higher than, those attracted by harm-causing offences. (2)They could 
be served on offenders on the basis of relatively low standards of evidence (i.e. civil 
proceeding standards). (3) They in effect personalized a criminal law, setting out prohibitions 
that, unlike the orthodox criminal law, only one person might have to abide by, prohibitions 
that, what is more, might prevent an agent from harmlessly going to places necessary for 
getting a job or leading an otherwise lawful social life. Worse, according to Ashworth, 
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Zedner and others,22  (4) ASBOs and orders like them failed to treat offenders as responsible 
agents with respect to the harm or nuisance the orders sought to prevent. By coercively 
excluding certain kinds of behavior, ASBOs pre-empted choices by offenders not to engage 
in them.  
How many of these objections apply convincingly to Serious Crime Prevention Orders 
(SCPOs)?  Objection (2) does not, since conviction for a serious crime is a condition for 
imposing such an order. In other words, civil standards do not, in the case of SCPOs, bring 
into force a disproportionate criminal penalty for prohibited behavior. Instead, criminal 
evidence standards have to be met at the conviction stage.  At a later stage, when the 
prevention order is imposed, courts –in the first place the High Court in England and Wales-- 
must have reasons for believing that the behavior prohibited by the order “would protect the 
public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime in 
England and Wales.”23 As I understand this condition, it would not be met if the places from 
which a person subject to the order were excluded were not reasonably believed to be 
connected with serious crime, or if excluded personal associates were not reasonably believed 
to be involved in serious crime. 24. 
Objection (1) does not apply, either, since, in the case of SCPOs, the penalty for the breach 
on indictment is not disproportionately severe. It is no more in fact than the maximum for a 
breach of an ASBO: five years.25 What about objection (3)?  The idea seems to be that 
preventive orders single out offenders and their circumstances in ways that criminal law 
shouldn’t. But many of the crimes to which the Serious Crime Act (2007) refers are carried 
out by crime gangs, with known associates.  To the extent that orders are reasonably believed 
to prevent an agent from resuming a place in a criminal gang, they seem justified.  
Admittedly, they might be out of place in many other cases. e.g. if imposed on an ex-criminal 
who had a short record of committing offences independently. And certain specific 
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prohibitions in the order may be unreasonable in some cases.   The fact that the orders are 
directed at particular people and so lack the generality of law does not by itself seem to me to 
be an objection, so long as the reasons for imposing the orders are drawn from a well-
established pattern of re-offending on the part of the offender, and facts about the plans and 
influence of the offender’s associates 
I come, finally, to objection (4), that agents addressed by preventive orders are treated as 
lacking responsibility. Someone can be ordered to do something they are responsible enough 
to do anyway. And orders can sometimes help those who are weak-willed or exposed to 
coercion to behave better than they might have in the absence of the orders.  I have already 
pointed out that the existence of the orders may actually help those who were once involved 
in organized crime, and who want to leave it, not to succumb to pressure from associates to 
rejoin. If they can face re-arrest and imprisonment for resuming their former place in a 
criminal gang, and their past criminal associates know this fact, the ex-offender has more 
scope to avoid making contact or refusing to make contact on the pretext of protecting 
himself from the “authorities.” This keeps the ex-offender from having dangerously to spurn 
the advances of a crime gang on his own initiative.  In other words, the order can be an aid to 
responsible behavior, helping an offender to avoid recruitment for the commission of 
victimizing harm or behavior that damages worthwhile institutions. 
In any case, the question of what it is to treat the addressees of criminal law as responsible is 
relevant to much more than prevention orders. For example, when criminal law proper 
threatens a life-sentence for homicide, it is threatening hard treatment for a kind of offence  
there are perfectly good independent reasons for not committing, reasons that have nothing to 
do with undergoing that hard treatment. The pain inflicted by many methods of murder; the 
fact that loss of life puts an end to a person’s practical capacities and a person’s plans, causes 
misery for others who are close to the victim—those are commonly known good reasons for 
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omitting murder, and criminal laws take them as givens rather than spell them out. A 
genuinely responsible agent would presumably act on these reasons rather than be deterred 
from murder by the unpleasantness of a life sentence.   
When criminal laws are communicated with a threat of hard treatment to agents then, are 
agents being treated as responsible? In Kant, the threats make sense because people living 
together under law in actual polities (as opposed to a kingdom of ends) are assumed to be 
imperfectly rational—with a pathology as well as reason.   Accordingly, criminal laws, which 
are meant to regulate pathologically-influenced behavior, have to appeal to more than reason. 
They have to operate in the sphere of what Kant calls” inclinations” –impulses to pursue 
gratification adding up to “happiness” and to avoid pain. That is the reason why laws threaten 
punishments. The more rational one is, the more autonomous one is, the more responsible-- 
in the sense of autonomous-- one is, the more one abides by the law against murder for 
reasons other than hard treatment. For this sort of agent, the threat of hard treatment is as 
much an insult to their responsibility or rational agency as a list of places he must not go and 
people he must not associate with. If the insult to responsibility is tolerable in the law against 
homicide, why isn’t it tolerable in the preventive order? 
 At this point, skeptics about preventive justice may have to turn to fundamental differences 
in “logic” between punishment and prevention. Punishment takes account of an agent’s past 
law-breaking behavior and imposes hard treatment proportionate to that behavior.   
But where a measure is preventive, a rather different logic seems to be entailed— that 
the type and quantum of the measure imposed must be those judged necessary to 
bring about a significant reduction in the risk of future harm, irrespective of whether 
those measures are proportionate to any past or present conduct of the subject. . . .  
[W]here the rationale is desert, the punishment must censure the subject in a way and 
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to an extent that respects his or her responsible agency, and the role of prevention is to 
supply underlying deterrence, whereas the choice or quantum of the sanction should 
be governed by proportionality considerations. Where prevention is the rationale its 
logic applies without respect for whether the subject is a responsible agent or not, 
since the purpose is to obtain the optimal preventive outcome.26 
But this line of thought is highly disputable.27 It implies that proportionality is at home with 
punishment but not prevention, and it is easy to think of counterexamples. Thus, it is 
customary for department stores to prevent shoplifting by CCTV surveillance, by alarm-
activating devices attached to goods, and by posting unarmed security guards at exits 
equipped with alarms. Preventing shoplifting by shooting shoplifters at exits might be more 
effective, but there is nothing in the logic of prevention that entails that shoplifting be 
prevented at all costs, or that shooting be preferred to arrest by unarmed guards when both 
are effective. 
Preparatory offences are proportionately less severely punished than consummated offences.  
If the penalties reflected the alleged logic of prevention, the penalties would be whatever was 
sufficient to discourage taking first steps toward the consummated offence. Sufficiency might 
be associated with much more severe penalties than are actually threatened or applied in 
relation to preparatory offences. Again, preparatory offences work with police strategies of 
disrupting the plans of those embarked on serious crime. This is not a matter of as it were 
paralyzing the planners of serious crime, but of bringing charges so as to induce the thought 
that continuing with those plans will be futile because the plans are no longer secret. 
The “different-logics” claim associates proportionate punishment for individuals after 
prosecution with respecting persons, and associates prevention with treating people 
indiscriminately –regardless of their past conduct—and treating them as appropriate sites for 
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whatever discouraging pressures produce omissions of unwanted behavior.  This sharp 
contrast between prevention and punishment makes no allowance for the way that the threat 
of punishment works in laws against consummated offences. For example, the law against 
homicide is addressed to everyone in a jurisdiction—irrespective of their past or present 
behavior. If ignoring past behavior is objectionable in the criminalization of preparatory acts, 
why is it not also objectionable in the threats of punishment carried by laws whose 
prosecution starts after the fact? In laws against homicide, for example, the threat of hard 
treatment in the form of a long term of imprisonment is addressed to those who would not 
dream of killing anyone, as well as those who would.  Why does not this indiscriminate form 
of address treat too many people as dangerous if preparatory offences do?  Again, why is not 
the threat of severe treatment for homicide also open to the objection that it uses fear of 
imprisonment to deter people rather than thoughts about the costs to people of being killed? I 
think the Ashworth-Zedner argument from the different logics of prevention and punishment 
does imply—controversially if not simply incorrectly-- that the threat in the law against 
homicide is objectionable for both its indiscriminateness and its eliciting demotivating fear 
rather than demotivating reasons --thoughts about the badness of being killed.   
When the Terrorism Act prescribes punishments for, among other offences, violent killing on 
a large-scale, the rationale of the specified punishments is desert. According to the preventive 
justice skeptics, however, the criminalization of acts preparatory to terrorism depends on a 
different logic just because it is preventive. This kind of argument also proves too much. It 
seems to me to distort the relation between a serious victimizing offence and e.g. the offence 
of attempting the victimizing offence. Clearly the gravity of the fully realized offence is part 
of the source for the gravity of the offence of attempt. In other words, if it is very wrong (and 
punishable by the severest hard treatment) to murder a great number of people, then it is also 
wrong to attempt to murder a great number of people, and the rationale for making attempts 
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punishable has something in common with the rationale for punishing mass murder itself, i.e. 
the badness of loss of life, the typical violence and pain associated with murders, mass fear 
and so on. In the case of an offence that often aims at mass-murder, i.e. terrorism, the 
Terrorism Act not only says “Don’t do it-- or else!”; it says, roughly, “Don’t even think about 
it—or else!” Of course the “or else”  in the case of pre-attempt offences alludes to a much 
less severe penalty than for a successful terrorist act, because the harm done by pre-attempt 
offences can be minimal. In this sense proportionality operates.   The agent has set off on a 
path toward a terrorist act, though perhaps not very far on that path:  how does it show 
disrespect to the agent for the law to insert into his deliberations the thought of a punishment 
for taking any steps toward an atrocity? 
There may be a good answer to this question, based on the breadth of the definition of 
terrorism in the UK Terrorism Acts,28 and the sheer variety and vagueness of offences treated 
as preparatory or precursor offences. ‘Terrorism’ as defined in these Acts is far widerin 
application than the working definition used in section I, where we were operating at the 
transjurisdictional level of generality occupied by von Hirsch and Jareborg, and where we 
related terrorism to  mass homicide for the coercion of governments.   The Terrorism Act 
(2006) notoriously contains an offence (Section 1) of indirectly encouraging an act of 
terrorism. This can take the form of an approving online comment for a UK audience on a 
past terrorist act. It is certainly questionable whether something along these lines is likely to 
or is intended to lead to an act of terrorism, so that criminalizing it does, perhaps, prejudge 
the danger posed by people whose radicalism consists primarily of online poses and gestures. 
Poses and gestures may not be steps toward any atrocity at all. Neither need they inspire the 
large-scale violent acts that constitute uncontroversial examples of terrorism.  Offences of 
possessing articles for the use of terrorism (Terrorism Act (2000) Section 57) may be open to 
similar criticism. 
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So although I deny that the criminalization of preparatory offences belongs to a logic of 
bypassing the agency of potential offenders, I do not maintain that all of the criminalization 
associated with the Terrorism Act is entirely in order. I agree that the offence of glorifying 
terrorism is ill defined, that “possession” offences may catch the innocent, and that non-
disclosure offences can be hard for people to avoid if they are researching terrorism for 
academic purposes and subject themselves to the usual confidentiality norms governing 
interviews with research subjects. Here the Terrorism Act carries serious risks of injustice. 
But I am unconvinced by more general arguments against preventive justice in the area of 
serious crime.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Anderson, David. The Terrorism Acts in 2012. London: Stationery Office, 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243472/97801
08512629.pdf  
 
Ashworth, Andrew. Sentencing and Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Ashworth, Andrew and Lucia Zedner. Preventive Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
 
Asp, Petter. “Preventionism and Criminalization of Nonconsummate Offences.” In 
Prevention and the Limits of Criminal Law, edited by Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, and 
Patrick Tomlin, . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 23-46 
29 
 
 
Drury, Ian. 2015. “Web Whizkids at Risk of Turning to Online Crime: Warning Children 
who Illegally Download Films or Music Could Engage in More Serious Cyber-crime.” Daily 
Mail, June 4. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3110169/Web-whizkids-risk-turning-
online-crime-Warning-children-illegally-download-films-music-engage-cyber-crime.html 
 
Duff, R. A. “Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law.” In The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law, edited by R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo and 
Victor Tadros, . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.pp. 88-112. 
 
Greenfield, Victoria and Lucia Paoli. “A Framework to Assess the Harms of Crimes.” British 
Journal of Criminology 53, no. 5 (2013): 864–86. 
 
Hirsch, Andrew von and Nils Jareborg. ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard 
Analysis’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), 1-38. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. 
 
Hodgson, Jacqueline and Tadros, Victor . “The Impossibility of Defining Terrorism.” New 
Criminal Law Review 16, no. 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 494-526. 
 
Home Department. Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee and Justice Committee. 
Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Serious Crime Act 2007. London: Stationery Office, 2012.  
30 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228623/8502.p
df  
 
Home Office. The Illicit Drug Trade in the United Kingdom. London: HMSO 2007. 
 
Lomell, Heidi “Punishing the Uncommitted Crime: Prevention, Pre-emption, Precaution and 
the Transformation of Criminal Law.” In Justice and Security in the 21st Century: Risks, 
Rights and the Rule of Law, edited by Barbara Hudson and Synnove Ugelvik, 83-100. 2012. 
 
Sen, Amartya. The Standard of Living. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
 
Sherman, Lawrence, Peter William Neyroud and Eleanor Neyroud. “The Cambridge Crime 
Harm Index: Measuring Total Harm from Crime Based on Sentencing Guidelines.” Policing 
10, no. 3 (2016): 171-83. doi:10.1093/police/paw003 
 
Sorell, Tom. “Online Grooming and Preventive Justice.” Criminal Law and Philosophy. 
(forthcoming). doi:10.1007/s11572-016-9401-x 
 
 
Transparency International UK. Corruption in the UK: Overview & Policy 
Recommendations. March 2012. https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/corruption-in-
the-uk-overview-policy-recommendations/   
 
Walker, Clive. “The Legal Definition of ‘Terrorism’ in United Kingdom Law and Beyond” 
Public Law (2007): 331-52. 
 
31 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
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1  See von Hirsch and Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm,” 1-38. The authors say that their paper was prompted 
by the increasing invocation of proportionality in the 1980s. The paper continues to be highly influential. See 
the latest edition of Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, ch 4. Also heavily influenced by von Hirsch 
and Jareborg are Greenfield and Paoli, “Framework to Assess Harms.” A number of other approaches gauge 
seriousness of harm by length of sentence and victim or public perceptions of seriousness. These latter are of 
little use in justifying sentencing. For an overview and a variation on these approaches, see Sherman, Neyroud, 
and Neyroud “Cambridge Crime Harm Index.” 
2 von Hirsch and Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm,” 17-19. The general approach is inspired by Sen, 
Standard of Living.  
3 von Hirsch and Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm,”   19-21. 
4 I realize that the large-scale lethal attack is not the only variety of terrorism, and that terrorism legislation in 
England and Wales is often criticized for criminalizing precursor and preparatory acts, not to mention acts of 
praising past attacks. Some of these offences will be discussed later. But for the purpose of discussing von 
Hirsch and Jareborg a standardized type of offence is required, and I am stipulating that it is the large-scale 
lethal attack. The difficulty of defining terrorism is well known and perhaps insuperable. See for example, 
Hodgson and Tadros, “Impossibility of Defining Terrorism.” 
5 Von Hirsch and Jareborg, “Gauging Criminal Harm,”  33-34. 
6 Hobbes, Leviathan, 231. “But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments 
of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to 
himselfe.” 
7 Ibid., 123 
8 Ibid., 163 
9 This evidence could take the form of reliable information from informants, convictions, social scientific 
investigations commissioned by the government, or independently carried out by e.g. university researchers. 
10 Transparency International mentions the use by organized crime of social housing for prostitution by women 
it has trafficked. See Corruption in the UK, 10.  
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11  See Home Office, The Illicit Drug Trade. 
12 The argument for treating participation in a violent, illegal market as serious crime may also be an argument 
for policy that will remove the violence, e.g. by creating a legal and regulated drug market. Discussion of this 
issue is outside the scope of the present paper. 
13  Serious Crime Act 2007. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/27 
14 Counterfeiting of goods is not within the scope of Schedule 1 counterfeiting offence. 
15 See Home Department, Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee, 3.  In the UK an estimated 38,000 
people are involved in organized crime. See Transparency International, Corruption in the UK, 2. 
16 This is not to say that the well-off are not damaged by having their property stolen. They are still victims of 
intellectually property offences notwithstanding their wealth. If they have invested in the products pirated at 
some risk of losing their money, they might deserve, other things being equal, to reap the financial rewards, 
notwithstanding the fact that they do not need those rewards. A multibillionaire who loses a million through 
theft is in that sense also a victim of a serious financial crime. But if the loss of a million is the aggregate of 
minute losses from individual downloads by poor downloaders, there may be noone on whom a just punishment 
can be visited by a Serious Crimes Act.  
17 An official of the UK National Crime Agency has recently suggested that downloading offences lead to 
serious cyber-crime offences. See Drury, “Web Whizkids.” 
18 In another intermediate case internet sites are hacked and information stolen. If the point of the theft is 
simply to bring to light a vulnerability, and the information is not used to victimize data subjects, maybe even 
punishment is out of order.  
19 See Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, ch. 1, notes 21, 22, 30-34. 
20 See Lomell, “Punishing the Uncommitted Crime,” 83-100. 
21 Ibid. See also Asp, “Preventionism and Criminalization.”  
22 See Duff, “Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law,” 100. 
23 Serious Crime Act (2007), Section 1 (b). 
24 The cases of R v. Hancox (Dennis) [2010] EWCA Crim 102, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1434 and R v. Carey 
(Andrew) and Taylor (Darren) [2012] EWCA Crim 1592 say that there has to be “a real and significant risk” 
and “more than just a bare possibility” that the defendant will commit further serious crimes in order for an 
SCPO to be necessary to protect the public. This means that people who are convicted of more minor offences 
and have no previous convictions would not necessarily be subject to an order. In Carey, one of the applicants 
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successfully appealed against an SCPO on the basis that the judge had held that the risk of his being involved in 
future serious crimes was very low, and although he had participated in organised drug dealing, he had not 
played an organising role and was therefore unlikely to be an organiser in future. 
The orders imposed are apparently sweeping at times, and this is at least partly due to the breadth of the 
restrictions that the Act allows in section 5. For example, in R v. Hall (Robert), Wynne (Emmet) and Knight 
(Ian David) [2014] EWCA Crim 2046, the defendants, who had conspired to rob a bank, were prohibited from 
being near bank premises at night for longer than fifteen minutes while in charge of a vehicle, which in the end 
prevented their doing things like going to the cinema:  they appealed and were allowed to make written 
submissions on the drafting of the restrictions. Again, SCPOs have on occasion been in danger of interfering 
with fundamental rights, as in R v Mcintyre (Andrew James)[2012] EWCA Crim 3085, in which the defendant, 
a drug-dealer, was prohibited from associating or communicating with his long-term partner of ten years, who 
was a co-conspirator. This provision was modified, as it was held to interfere with the defendant's right to 
maintain private relationships. 
I am grateful to my daughter, Lucy Sorell, for researching relevant case law. 
25  See Serious Crime Act (2007), Section 25. 
26 Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive Justice, 18. 
27 The next two paragraphs are drawn from my forthcoming “Online Grooming and Preventive Justice.” 
28 The breadth of the definition has been a recurring topic of criticism from the Independent Reviewer of the 
legislation, David Anderson, and his predecessor, Lord Carlile. See e.g. Anderson, “Terrorism Acts in 2012,” 
ch.4. For comprehensive discussion, see Walker, “Legal Definition of ‘Terrorism.’” 
